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There is also a new dimension o f legal training developing in 
the United States which is an outgrowth o f attention being given 
to the legal problems o f the poor. There are neighborhood legal 
clinics being established in many areas of the United States, and 
they are being m anned by young lawyers, youthful graduates, who 
are prepared to develop their skills in this practice. It is fair to say 
that the traditional legal education which many American law 
schools have supplied is not terribly good training for such practice. 
There is a level o f legal problem, a kind o f legal problem which in 
the past has often been ignored because o f the poverty of the 
claim ant, which is now being pursued with considerable vigor. 
Traditional law o f landlord-tenant, o r o f debtor-creditor is being 
re-examined with a kind of intensity that has not been known for 
some time. And lawyers are being asked to treat these problems 
with the same attention that one gives to areas which in the past 
have been deemed more significant. There is a need to find ways 
to achieve legal representation for the poor, and it may require 
a form of group practice somewhat unfamiliar to our profession. 
And, it must be done in a way which will preserve the sanctity and 
the personal nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Law schools 
are surely destined to provide the required training and the leader­
ship in developing the modes o f practice which will be needed.
Let me conclude, then, as I started. The “ Quest for Justice” is 
a never-ending search, and there is a continuous call for lawyers, for 
legal educators, and law students to join the search. The new facilities 
for a faculty of law here at the University o f New Brunswick will 
surely bring together those who will play their part in carrying on 
that quest.
T H E QUEST FOR JU STICE:
TH E ROLE O F TH E PROFESSION
Gerald E. Le D ainf
Our corporate responsibility for justice is a reflection o f the 
scope and relative im portance o f our role in society. It is not a 
narrow responsibility, confined to a particular area, such as the 
adversary process. It is the general responsibility o f citizens having 
critical influence as advisers and decision-makers throughout the 
legal order. U ndoubtedly, we have a special responsibility for the 
quality o f what may be called judicial justice—that is, the justice 
dispensed in our adjudicative processes. The philosophical basis of
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judicial justice may be older than the legal profession, but the 
elaboration and refinement o f procedural due process is in many 
ways our distinctive contribution to human knowledge and ex­
perience. In other respects, we are mainly applying our techniques 
to making the knowledge and insights o f other disciplines legally 
operative and effective. Yet in the employment of these techniques 
we are inevitably and inextricably involved in the substantive choices 
that are made. We cannot escape responsibility for the quality of 
what I propose to refer to here as social justice: the standards of 
justice reflected in our laws, our agreements, our exercises of 
authority, and our human relations and social conditions generally. 
In a word, we must be concerned with justice in its broadest sense 
and deepest implications: with the concept o f justice as an ideal 
relation among men.
There is, moreover, an intimate relation between social justice 
and public confidence in the integrity o f our judicial processes. It is 
impossible to erect a satisfactory system o f judicial justice—that is, 
one which not only works justly but is felt to work justly—upon a 
foundation o f widespread social injustice. O ur legal procedures will 
be assumed to reflect the inequalities arising from gross disparity 
in the financial means and general capacity to defend one’s interests.
Accordingly, I do not feel that I can properly confront this 
subject w ithout saying something about social justice, but I shall 
confine my observations to what I believe should be the main ob ­
jective and criterion o f social justice: equality of opportunity. Not 
all questions o f social justice can be related to equality of op­
portunity—for example, it does not answer the problems o f the 
aged and others who, for one reason or another, are incapable of 
working— but when we begin to examine its implications in relation 
to our youth and our hopes for the future, we find it to be a helpful 
standard for identifying our deficiencies and ordering our priorities.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the objective is not equality— 
that can never be, even if it were desirable—but rather equality of 
opportunity to make the most o f one’s self. It is trite to say that 
there will always be inequalities in physical and mental capacity and 
the moral attributes necessary for successful living, but we should 
strive to achieve the minimum conditions required to offer each 
individual a reasonably equal opportunity to develop his potential 
and to express himself in work suited to his temperament and 
capacities. This is not only a moral imperative but a m atter o f 
enlightened self interest. Justice is an end in itself, but like other 
aspects o f the moral law, it has its utilitarian value as well. Through 
social injustice we waste valuable hum an resources and, in the end, 
the whole country loses. As a learned profession competing with 
many other disciplines and vocational attractions for young people
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o f character and ability, we have a special interest in doing every­
thing we can to assure equality o f opportunity. To sustain itself and 
to discharge its very heavy responsibility o f public service and 
leadership, our profession requires a steady flow o f young people 
o f distinctly above-average ability, judgm ent and strength o f char­
acter. As we know, it is a profession that is very exacting in its 
intellectual and m oral demands. The raw material that goes into it 
must be o f fine and sturdy composition. We cannot leave this supply 
to the accidents o f heredity, wealth, privilege or nepotism.
The conditions which affect opportunity extend back, o f course, 
to childhood and, indeed, beyond into the mysteries of heredity. 
There are limits to what we can do by legislation. We cannot legislate 
domestic happiness or even domestic tranquillity. We can only do 
what we can to make it possible for parents, if they will, to provide 
a reasonably secure, decent and healthful home atmosphere. A child 
does not start out in life with an equal opportunity to make the 
most o f himself if his physical, mental o r emotional development has 
been seriously impaired by the conditions of his early environment. 
As a profession having great influence on public and private deci­
sions, we must try to exert that influence wherever we can to assure 
that it is possible for parents in Canada to provide reasonably 
adequate standards o f housing, clothing and nutrition for their 
children.
W ith respect to the other things that go into the total home 
environment, both physical and psychological, we can only hope 
that more enlightened policies in our legislation and procedures 
governing domestic relations, as well as the increasing availability 
o f counselling and other family services, will prom ote greater 
stability and confidence in family life. W here there is a greater sense 
o f freedom, dignity and equality, there may hopefully be a more 
m ature view of the nature of the family and the need for compromise 
and adjustm ent. Certainly, we cannot put too much effort into the 
task o f strengthening the foundations o f family life. O ur profes­
sional activities and attitudes in this field have an  im portant educa­
tional effect. O ur conception o f the family and the variety of personal 
relations involved in it is necessarily reflected in the laws that we 
draft and the m anner in which we administer them. The values 
implicit in these laws and procedures have a profound influence 
upon public and private opinions and attitudes.
Together with the home environment, education is the single 
most im portant factor bearing on equality o f opportunity. Indeed, 
it may overcome many o f the disadvantages of the home environ­
ment. Equality o f educational opportunity is an issue which con­
fronts the legal profession in a particularly acute form because o f 
the long period o f training required to become a lawyer. Does the
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cost o f  this long route today mean that the legal profession is 
drawing too heavily from a relatively small group in the population 
with a particular social perspective and bias? The effective adap ta­
tion o f law to a society in rapid process o f change requires a variety 
o f social experience and concern. It is highly desirable tha t the legal 
profession be as representative as possible o f all classes o f society.
Studies have shown that there is a definite correlation between 
social status and educational opportunity in Canada. The less 
fortunate in our society face psychological as well as financial 
obstacles. We have reason to believe tha t we are losing many young 
people o f ability. Because o f the negative factors operating in their 
situation, they need moral encouragement as well as financial assist­
ance to  help them continue with their education. This is particularly 
true a t the upper levels o f the secondary system and at the level o f 
higher education.
I know it is often said that with the necessary ability and will, a 
young man or woman can always find a way to get to university. 
There may be a good deal o f truth in this. A person o f exceptional 
ability and ambition has a way of surm ounting all obstacles; but 
if the obstacles are too great, there will be many below this high 
level o f achievement and determ ination (yet potentially very valuable 
members o f society) who must drop into the labour market with 
under-developed capacities. The cost o f maintaining a young person 
in university today is becoming a very heavy burden. I am afraid 
tha t it is making university education increasingly the privilege o f 
the affluent. The fact that there are more o f the affluent than there 
used to be may obscure not only the social injustice but the 
country’s loss.
There is no doubt that considerable progress has been made in 
reducing the financial obstacles to university education. There is 
now much more available in the way o f financial assistance, but we 
may be expecting our young people to carry too great a burden of 
debt into the beginning of their careers. And there are serious prob­
lems arising from regional economic disparities and the limitations 
o f  provincial capacity. 1 do not know whether the country as a 
whole can afford free university education for those qualified to 
take it, but if it cannot, I believe there may be something radically 
wrong with our order of priorities and the way we are spending 
our gross national product. (I cannot help reflecting on what might 
have happened in my own case if I had not benefited from  the 
veterans’ program  after the last war. It is too bad that we only 
seem to  be able to justify some of these more imaginative measures 
when we fight a war.) I would go further, and say that it is in the 
interests o f our development, and in the interests particularly of 
C anadian unity, that students should be able to take their university
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education (or a t least some part o f it) away from their home town 
so that they can learn something about other parts o f the country 
and acquire a broader outlook as Canadians. This would require 
financial assistance to help them pay for residential accom m odation. 
The money for all this, if it is to be available at all, would have to 
come from redistribution and re-allocation o f national income. 1 
do not see how we can approxim ate to equality o f educational 
opportunity in this country without recognizing that the federal 
government must play an im portant financial role in this field.
Equality o f educational opportunity will not bear its fruit unless 
it is accompanied by equality o f vocational opportunity. This is, o f 
course, a complex question because abilities and the requirements 
of different vocations vary so much. We must leave considerable 
scope for judgm ent as to the personal qualities which make for 
success in a particular vocation. W hat may appear in some cases 
as prejudice or discrimination may be a conscientious belief that a 
certain background guarantees personal qualities which are thought 
to be essential—as long as it is personal qualities and not personal 
prejudices that we are looking for in these situations. As I under­
stand it, the sense o f security that is inspired by the sight o f a 
particular school tie is a feeling that you may count on how the 
wearer will react to certain standard issues or situations. In other 
words, you will be able to rely on his general assumptions and out­
look. No doubt this is one o f the principal considerations behind 
the various forms of social cohesion (clubs, fraternities and the like) 
by which we attem pt to preserve and further our interests and 
privileges. But there is growing resentment against this sort o f 
thing—and its ultimate fruition in what is referred to as the “ estab­
lishment”—insofar as it may prevent able young people who do 
not have the immediately recognizable marks of reliability from 
having a reasonable opportunity to show what they can do.
A part from the physical and mental handicaps created by adverse 
social conditions, and the financial difficulties of obtaining a higher 
education, the main obstacle to equality of opportunity in C anada 
today is the am ount of discrimination that is still practised against 
ethnic and racial minorities o f all kinds. The full extent o f it cannot 
be determined statistically o r established beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but what is significant is that members o f these groups still feel that 
it exists. I like to think that it is on the decrease, but it is something 
we cannot afford to be complacent about, because discrimination 
is a weapon which it is only too easy, and perhaps too human, to 
resort to in the highly competitive struggle of life. As a profession, 
we must support public and private efforts to eliminate discrimina­
tion, particularly from the areas of life where it affects equality 
of opportunity.
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It is sometimes assumed by young men starting out in our 
profession that if you do not have connections which can bring 
business it is difficult to gain admission to a good firm. I do not 
know how true that is today. Well established firms generally have 
enough “ business-getters” or they would not be well established. 
W hat they always need are com petent lawyers able to do the work 
for the clients whom the leaders bring back to the office after lunch. 
It is my impression that good offices are always on the lookout for 
ability. The ability to give service can be a very potent business- 
getter, whether one starts out with connections or not. Nevertheless, 
it is in our interests, as individuals, and as a profession, to make 
sure that prejudices do not cut us off from access to ability. How 
many young people today do not apply to certain firms because, 
for a variety o f reasons not related to their ability, they do not 
think they have a chance of acceptance? I do not know, but I think 
we are well to ask ourselves the question and to ask ourselves 
how we may rectify that impression, insofar as it may exist. Needless 
to say, enlargement o f opportunity will increase competition and 
in some cases eliminate the advantage which some derive today 
from  the accidents o f birth or social condition, but I do not see 
how a country in this modern age of complexity can safely pursue 
any other course.
I have dwelt at some length on equality of opportunity as an 
essential aspect o f social justice because I desire to emphasize my 
conviction that our professional concern must be increasingly with 
the standards of justice reflected by our acts and relationships 
outside the judicial process, as well as by those within it. There is 
increasing evidence o f a healing o f the divided self in law: expertise 
and social conscience are beginning to find each other. In our 
thinking about taxation, for example, questions o f justice are being 
brought to the level o f expert concern. Similarly, the attem pt to 
give organized and effective expression to the concern for consumer 
protection reflects a growing awareness of the degree to which the 
individual is becoming relatively powerless in a controlled and 
managed market. The quest for justice in the years ahead will 
increasingly involve an examination of the ethical implications o f 
relationships and procedures in areas which we have come to think 
o f as dominated by technical considerations o f expediency.
It is my impression that the revolution which we are passing 
through is one which, although marked at times by violence, is 
fundamentally concerned with human dignity, personal integrity and 
justice. It is a protest against authority, but it is above all a protest 
against the assumption that technological achievement and material 
well-being are an answer to everything: that they validate or sanctify 
everything that is done in society. I believe that the revolution is at
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bottom  an effort to restore the individual to his rightful place in 
society, and that it is a renewal o f ethical concern. W alter Lippm ann 
has said that we are “ living in a time when the central institutions 
o f the traditional life o f man are increasingly unable to com m and his 
allegiance and his obedience.” N o doubt this is true, but I believe 
there is more than merely disillusionment, disbelief or indifference. 
There is a profound stirring o f the conscience—not the puritan 
conscience which seems to have collapsed but a humanist conscience 
concerned with m an’s personality as well as his achievements. This 
revolution has been a long time in the making, and it is im portant 
for lawyers to realize that it carries with it a search for intellectual 
honesty as well as a great deal o f impatience with the authority o f 
tradition. The law is going to have to modernize its idiom, purify 
its thought processes and enlarge the range o f its relevant concerns. 
For the law is one of the voices o f authority  and will increasingly 
come to be the object o f critical evaluation by a generation that is 
emancipating itself from awe.
The spell has been broken. O ur political and social institutions 
are being shaken out o f a long period o f relative stability and 
complacency, and are now in a period o f rapid transform ation, 
which corresponds, if it is not com parable, to the pace o f change 
in technology. Everything is being questioned or challenged. N othing 
is considered sacred or inviolable. The new generation is fighting off 
the thrall o f alienation. It is handling the things we have created, 
and in some cases, handling them roughly. The implications o f all 
this for our profession, and particularly for legal education and 
training, are profound, although the outline can as yet be only 
dimly perceived. An increasing proportion o f our professional time 
will be devoted to guiding change, as distinct from operating what 
is known and established: change in our institutions and funda­
mental relationships, change in our ways o f ordering relations and 
resolving conflicts. There is all the difference in the world between 
the background required to identify the causes o f institutional break­
down and to prescribe and implement constructive change, and that 
which is required to perform technical tasks within a framework 
o f familiar institutions, relationships and assumptions.
To cope with change in a truly conservative and, yet, construc­
tive m anner the lawyer must have a jurisprudential understanding 
o f law—that is, a firm grasp o f fundam entals in their various rela­
tions. He must also have a vivid and intimate understanding o f the 
dynamics o f political and social institutions and of how the law 
operates in relation to other methods o f social control. These are 
perceptions that can only be developed by concentration on the 
basic themes or concerns of law and on the relation between law 
and other branches o f hum an activity and knowledge. The changes
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that are called for are changes in the role and methods o f law, in 
the relationships o f power, in the substitution of o ther processes 
for power or conflict.
We are witnessing this challenge to our capacity for adaptation 
in many areas o f life today: industrial relations, the university, the 
m aintenance o f public order, to name but a few. One o f the most 
difficult questions ahead o f us, for example, is how to fit the business 
corporation, which is exercising governmental power, into a polity 
that continues to pay lip service to the fiction that business is in the 
private or non-governmental sector o f society. O ur political theory 
takes practically no account o f the business corporation as an 
instrum ent of government policy—both as influencing government 
rules and making rules o f its own which effect governmental pur­
poses. The quest for justice will be somewhat unsophisticated unless 
we recognize m odern corporate power for what it is— not merely 
entrepreneurial and productive, but profoundly governmental and 
regulatory in its character—and attem pt to relate this power to the 
processes by which governmental authority  is subjected to public 
scrutiny and evaluation and is surrounded by procedural safeguards 
and controls to assure the protection of individual rights. This 
process inevitably involves much greater visibility o f corporate pur­
poses and procedures, as well as representation of public interests.
Because o f the great confidence which our profession has in the 
judicial process as the safeguard o f individual rights we tend to 
view the quest for justice as involving the judicialization of power 
wherever that is possible. This is our distinctive point o f view and 
the area o f our distinctive contribution. It has, o f course, its draw ­
backs and dangers, particularly where it interferes with adm inistra­
tive freedom and efficiency. A good deal o f our reforming energy in 
the years ahead will be devoted to extending the application of the 
judicial process and improving the quality o f it. F or it is the chief 
means by which power is disciplined by law. The tendency to 
judicialization will be directed to  two main objectives: the substitu­
tion o f arbitral process for conflict and the elaboration o f fair pro­
cedures where individual rights and obligations are being effectively 
determined. One o f our most presssing needs is to put the right to a 
fair hearing in administrative law on a rational basis, in respect both 
of application and content.
It is astonishing that we have managed to surround this whole 
question with uncertainty and confusion. It is not only a bad adver­
tisement for our intellectual resources but might even raise a question 
as to our seriousness o f purpose. We have allowed the right to a 
hearing to turn on highly abstract and artificial considerations and 
distinctions which cannot possibly satisfy the individual sense o f 
justice and fair play. For this is what is at issue here: not merely an
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objective analysis o f the precise legal effect o f a particular exercise 
o f power, or whether, as a practical matter, that exercise of power 
is likely to be influenced by representations from the person affected, 
but satisfaction of the individual sense o f justice—and this, not 
merely as a good in itself, but as maintaining confidence in the 
process and inducing cheerful compliance with it.
In some cases we have denied a hearing on the ground that an 
exercise of power, although involving a decision determinative of 
rights and obligations, is so governed by policy considerations as 
to make it an administrative rather than a judicial function. In other 
cases, we have denied a hearing, or some specific right o f representa­
tion or intervention ordinarily associated with judicial process, on 
the ground that the particular administrative act, although obviously 
going to have an im portant effect on the result, is not technically 
determinative o f rights and obligations. In neither type of case has 
the result flowed from a realistically functional analysis o f the power 
in question, but rather from a highly conceptual approach which 
bears the marks of the development o f law by assertions o f jurisdic­
tion, tentative and restrained in their scope and justification. We see 
here the limitations o f the development o f law by analogy. On the 
one hand, it obliges us to strain similarity; on the other hand, it 
may unnecessarily restrict the scope of an im portant principle. It 
is here that conceptualism may conflict with realism, and if the 
judicial process is incapable o f further advance, it may have to be 
rescued by legislation.
The M cRuer Report on civil rights has dem onstrated the un­
certainty concerning the right to a hearing at common law and 
recommends that the requirement o f fair hearing should apply to 
all powers o f decision, whether administrative or judicial. The 
Report goes further and recommends that any person substantially 
and directly interested in the subject m atter o f an inquiry should have 
an opportunity to be heard and a right to cross-examine witnesses 
with respect to relevant matters. These recommendations recognize 
certain essential facts about powers o f decision which are character­
ized as administrative rather than judicial, as well as investigatory 
powers which do not involve a decision, strictly speaking.
It is essential that a person affected by an administrative decision 
should have an opportunity to know the mind o f the adm inistrator 
and to attem pt to influence the result. To say that a decision is to 
be based on policy, or that it is essentially discretionary, is not to 
say that it is not governed by any criteria o f relevance or that it 
it not susceptible o f rational and critical evaluation. To meet the 
test o f justice, every decision must meet the test o f reason, whether 
it is based on specific, concrete criteria or broad policy standards. 
It must find its ultimate justification and acceptance in a rational
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process. That process is not complete unless the person affected has 
had an opportunity to participate in it, to bring facts, reason, and 
his own views of policy to bear in an attem pt to persuade the mind 
o f the adm inistrator. The adm inistration may well benefit from the 
views o f others as to what the policy should be. There is no reason 
why it should not justify its own views o f policy. There is no basis 
for the view that policy or discretion are matters which the adm in­
istrator may keep to himself. A person affected by a decision is 
entitled to know why the adm inistrator has taken the view he has 
and to make the case against this view.
The denial o f a hearing, in the case o f a so-called administrative 
decision, is based on a completely unrealistic view o f the nature of 
decision-making, whether administrative or judicial, and o f the 
function o f representations by the person affected. The recognition 
o f the right to a hearing in the case o f a judicial decision is apparently 
based on the notion that it is worth allowing representations in such 
a case because the person or body who decides is bound and circum­
scribed by rules o f law. The object o f the representations in such a 
case is to dem onstrate that the facts and law require or dictate a 
certain decision. At least this is the theory. The denial o f the right 
to a hearing in the case of administrative or non-judicial decisions 
is apparently based on the notion that since the person who decides 
has a discretion based on policy, he cannot be obliged by the facts 
and law to make any particular decision. The conclusion is that any 
representations by the person affected are therefore useless since the 
adm inistrator can ignore them. This overlooks the point that he 
may in fact be influenced by them (and that such influence may 
conduce to better adm inistration), and that, in any event, and most 
im portant o f all, an opportunity to make such representations will 
satisfy the sense o f justice and fair play o f the person affected.
The second fact or aspect o f reality which the M cRuer Report 
recognizes in its recommendations concerning fair procedures in 
administrative law is that whether an investigation or inquiry is, 
strictly speaking, determinative o f rights and liabilities, it will often 
have an im portant effect upon the result, and may cause irreparable 
damage or injury, regardless of the formal decision. How can the 
ordinary citizen accept as just a process o f judicial reasoning that 
would deny him the right to counsel, to call witnesses, to cross- 
examine and to make representations, in any inquiry or investigation 
that may cause irreparable injury to his reputation or compromise 
his legal position in subsequent proceedings? He surely cannot be 
impressed by abstract and artificial distinctions between the decision 
which has immediate legal consequences or effects and the opinion 
which constitutes a mere report on which others may or may not 
act. W hat really m atters—the “ reality o f the situation” as one judge
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called it—is th a t the opinion o f the investigator is bound to have an 
im portant influence on subsequent official action. W hat is more, the 
publicity given to  the inquiry and report may form a public opinion 
which is effectively determinative of rights and obligations. Finally, 
as another judge, taking a realistic view o f the matter, has observed, 
confrontation by the person affected and his counsel can have a 
salutary effect on the conduct o f the investigator.
The difficulties in this branch o f the law point up as well as 
any other the path which the legal profession must pursue in the 
quest for justice: conceptualization will always be an  indispensable 
instrum ent in classifying and ordering the substance of law and in 
applying it to concrete cases, but it must not be an imperious source 
o f rules and solutions that deflect us from the discovery o f functional 
reality. The kind o f skill and sophistication in law that we have to 
develop is that which does not mistake the conceptual apparatus of 
the law for the end o f law, but is able to handle it as a flexible instru­
ment for the pursuit o f rational and just results.
Finally, I should like to touch on three areas in which I think 
it is essential for our profession to pursue values closely related to 
justice and public respect for law and legal processes despite the 
serious problems and risks which contem porary social conditions 
may suggest. The first is protection o f persons under suspicion or 
accusation, not only as a safeguard o f justice in the particular case, 
but as influencing attitudes on such matters as violence, integrity 
of the person, and personal freedom. Over against insistence on the 
rights o f the individual in criminal law, there is mounting and well- 
founded concern over the increase in crime, particularly crime 
accompanied by violence. It is a difficult choice, but all our history 
shows that abuse o f police power will brutalize feelings and subvert 
our judicial processes. O ur official attitudes towards hum an dignity, 
which in their turn influence individual attitudes, are best reflected 
in the way tha t we treat the unfortunate, the unloved and the 
despised.
The second area, in which we are already em barked upon 
controversial measures of reform, is the withdrawal o f law and legal 
repression from  the dom ain o f personal morality. The issues here 
are very complex—in particular, the determ ination o f what is 
socially harmful and what is not— but I agree with the general 
concern behind this development, which I take to be the proper 
function and application o f law. It is a question which we as a 
profession m ust always keep before us. It is fundam ental to  the 
sense o f justice as well as to personal freedom. In some cases the 
issue is whether a m atter should be subject to legal regulation at 
a ll; in others, the kind o f regulation that is appropriate. O ur constitu­
tional difficulties sometimes force us into unavoidable choices, as
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in our criminal law treatm ent o f restrictive trade practices, but our 
law exhibits many marks o f being unreasoningly punitive. Im prison­
ment for non-support is an example.
A third area in which we must press forward with reform despite 
certain problems and risks is the need to make our judicial process 
less costly, more expeditious, and generally more accessible. An 
adequate system o f legal aid is an obvious necessity, although there 
should be no illusions about the cost. A more serious problem per­
haps than the public expense o f making justice accessible to all is 
that if we reduce the risks o f litigation and generally make it too 
easy and inviting, we may defeat the purpose of trying to make it 
more expeditious. I suppose an equilibrium is inevitably established. 
Nevertheless, a prime objective o f the legal order must be to en­
courage adjustm ent and compromise and what the business man 
calls “ cutting your losses” . How did someone describe law a few 
years back? “ Law, the science o f inefficiency” ? It is not something 
for us to boast about, but it is profoundly true that we must minimize 
the am ount o f time and social energy that we are obliged to spend 
in the orderly resolution of conflicts. We all know the man who 
becomes absorbed in his case to the neglect o f his business. A society 
so absorbed must inevitably pay a price in productive enterprise. I 
think what I mean to say here—and this serves me as conclusion— 
is tha t in our continuing concern with the development o f a more 
just legal order, we must be careful not to exaggerate the place and 
role o f law in society. It is only one o f the forces making for social 
order, and we m ust never forget that it is regulative rather than 
creative. Its chief aim must always be to clear the field so that the 
creative purposes o f man can be carried on in an atm osphere of 
ordered freedom.
TH E ROLE O F LAW REFO RM  IN THE 
QUEST FO R JUSTICE
Richard G ossef
Two years ago, at the opening o f debate in the House of Lords 
on the first Annual Report o f the Law Commission, it was said:
True it is that law reform is generally regarded as a dull, dry subject 
which does not stir much heat or passion, at any rate unless it 
happens to touch upon such topics as capital punishment, homo­
sexual offences, abortion or perhaps divorce.
As I do not intend to regale you on those particular topics, brace 
yourselves!
f  Counsel, Ontario Law Reform Commission.
